Legally grounded fairness objectives by Holden-Sim, Dylan et al.
Legally grounded fairness objectives
Dylan Holden-Sim Gavin Leech Laurence Aitchison
University of Bristol,
dh17830@bristol.ac.uk
Abstract
Recent work has identified a number of formally
incompatible operational measures for the unfair-
ness of a machine learning (ML) system. As these
measures all capture intuitively desirable aspects
of a fair system, choosing “the one true” measure
is not possible, and instead a reasonable approach
is to minimize a weighted combination of mea-
sures. However, this simply raises the question of
how to choose the weights. Here, we formulate
Legally Grounded Fairness Objectives (LGFO),
which uses signals from the legal system to non-
arbitrarily measure the social cost of a specific
degree of unfairness. The LGFO is the expected
damages under a putative lawsuit that might be
awarded to those who were wrongly classified, in
the sense that the ML system made a decision dif-
ferent to that which would have be made under the
court’s preferred measure. Notably, the two quan-
tities necessary to compute the LGFO, the court’s
preferences about fairness measures, and the ex-
pected damages, are unknown but well-defined,
and can be estimated by legal advice. Further,
as the damages awarded by the legal system are
designed to measure and compensate for the harm
caused to an individual by an unfair classification,
the LGFO aligns closely with society’s estimate
of the social cost.
1. Introduction
Automated decision making systems have not only become
more prevalent, but are also being applied in increasingly
sensitive contexts (Kamiran & Calders, 2009; Kamishima
& Asoh, 2012; Cabitza et al., 2017; Gronlund, 2019). This
has led to demand for more transparent systems, as well as
tools for assuring fairness. A key result here is that systems
can discriminate on protected characteristics such as race,
religion and gender, even when protected attributes are not
an input to the system (Zˇliobaite˙ & Custers, 2016; Veale &
Binns, 2017).
The fundamental issue of algorithmic fairness is that no
single definition of fairness captures the full phenomenon.
Famously, the COMPAS recidivism prediction system was
used in the criminal justice process in several US states.
A ProPublica study argued that the COMPAS system was
racially discriminatory, finding that African Americans la-
beled ‘High risk’ were in fact 50% less likely to reoffend
than white defendants with the same label (Larson et al.,
2016). Flores et al responded by arguing that defendants
with the same COMPAS recidivism score had approximately
equal probability of recidivism (Flores et al., 2016). Here
we see a direct clash between operationalisations of fairness.
Attempts to formalise fairness have yielded many such rea-
sonable definitions (Hardt et al., 2016; Barocas et al., 2019;
Dwork et al., 2012); ideally, we would fulfill these simul-
taneously. But we can prove that some sets of common-
sensical definitions are incompatible, outside trivial cases
(Kleinberg et al., 2016; A.Chouldechova, 2017).
Since perfect multi-measure fairness is almost always impos-
sible, we instead aim at systems which minimise violations.
But it is unclear which fairness definitions to relax and to
what extent: subjective decisions about relative importance
are required. While it is clear that we cannot leave this task
to the system implementors alone, the problem is actually
far worse: as it is a question of values there may be irrecon-
cilable differences between different individuals and there
is no underlying well-defined but perhaps unknown “correct
answer”. Without a well-defined correct answer even in prin-
ciple, what weights should we pick? We note that society
can and must answer such question in other contexts using
the legal system. As such, we propose using the legal sys-
tem to operationalise society’s estimate of social costs. The
resulting Legally Grounded Fairness Objectives (LGFO)
measure the damages awarded to those who were wrongly
classified by the ML system under a putative lawsuit.
Minimising case cost as maximising social welfare
Our solution is to find the classifier which minimises the
damages to people classified differently under different defi-
nitions. That is, we minimise the legal cost of choosing one
measure over the other. This shifts the burden of selecting
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fairness measures onto the legal system and away from the
programmer.
Our contention is that the social cost of an unfair classifier
can be measured by the expected damages awarded to an
individual given a false classification.
On first glance, setting the objective to minimised legal
penalties looks inappropriate: as if privileging the interests
of the system deployer. However, it is reasonable to view
the size of legal damages is a proxy for social good, since:
1) in principle, the law is designed to reflect the values of a
society, including the broadest reading of fairness. 2) legal
damages are intended to reimburse an individual for harm
caused, as assessed by a judge. Thus, by minimising total
damages (for instance by reducing unfairness and so the
number of associated lawsuits) we simultaneously minimise
harm.
A key advantage of this perspective is that we make use of
the canonical process for balancing values and estimating
social costs: the law, in this case civil law. While we should
expect persistent disagreement about the nature of the social
good, the legal system is the working mechanism society
uses to approximate it, when informal means fail. In well-
functioning jurisdictions, the legal process has a degree
of public accountability, adaptiveness, and consensus - or
anyway more than an average IT department (Burri, 2016;
Israni, 2017).
A second advantage is the relative availability of high-
quality data. Our training signal is the monetary damages
awarded to the plaintiff in algorithmic discrimination cases;
in many jurisdictions, this data is openly available, e.g.
(BAILII, 2020). We also need to elicit expert legal opinion
on the type of fairness most applicable (or most often ap-
plied) in particular contexts, and on how much it would cost
in a given case if a plaintiff’s classification was changed.
Given these, we can minimise a weighted combination of
unfairness measures.
Related work
CFAθ (Zehlike et al., 2019) is a fairness algorithm used
to map distributions of raw scores towards the barycen-
ter, a distribution occupying “middle ground” between the
distributions of the different groups. The algorithm takes
parameter θ which gives the degree of the mapping. θ = 0
leaves the raw scores unchanged, whereas θ = 1 sets all
group distributions equal to the barycentre. It thus opera-
tionalises the tradeoff between individual fairness (low θ)
and group fairness (high θ). A value 0 < θ < 1 corre-
sponds to a partial mapping of group distributions towards
this barycenter. θ is normative: its tuning would ideally be
left to some democratic process. The issue is that selecting
an appropriate θ requires a nuanced understanding of the
algorithm by the decision maker, and the value is still a
decision rather than calculated based on concrete values (i.e.
legal costs).
The method proposed in (Dwork et al., 2012) encapsulates
the idea that ’similar people should be treated similarly’,
a view known as Individual Fairness. This is achieved by
enforcing a Lipschitz condition on the classifier: For any
two individuals x, y at a distance d(x, y) ∈ [0, 1] and map
to distributions M(x) and M(y) respectively, the statistical
distance between M(x) and M(y) is at most d(x, y). Or
D(M(x),M(y)) ≤ d(x, y).
This is intuitive: the difference in group outcomes should
be less than or equal to the difference in individuals. This
method is effective if domain knowledge can be used in
constructing the distance function, i.e. if the normative
work can be shared by other parties. But we have only
shifted the subjectivity problem onto the distance function:
whoever is given the task of defining d still has to work in
the absence of well-defined, unambiguous standards (Kim
et al., 2018).
Our contributions
We propose a new perspective in algorithmic fairness, using
legal costs as a proxy for the social cost of a given fairness
measure.
We define a method to account for multiple fairness mea-
sures and give an overall degree of unfairness, allowing for
fairness maximisation.
We report experiments on a real-world dataset, showing that
fairness measure combinations can correct naive correla-
tions between the response variable and protected attributes.
2. Methods
Our algorithm is a post-processing step for binary classifiers.
We find the cost-minimal decision boundary for each group:
the pair (t0, t1) where ti denotes the decision boundary (i.e.
threshold value) for group i.
The fairness measures we use are initially binary proper-
ties: either satisfied perfectly or violated perfectly. To find
decision boundaries which maximise a given fairness defi-
nition, we translate these notions into measures: functions
of outcomes which are minimal at 0 (where the property is
perfectly satisfied) and increase as we deviate further from
the definition.
Unfairness as cost measure
There are many proposed measures; here we focus on three,
namely Sufficiency, Equalised Odds and Statistical Parity
(Barocas et al., 2019; Hardt et al., 2016; Dwork et al., 2012).
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In (Kleinberg et al., 2016) it was proven that these mea-
sures are mutually incompatible outside of trivial cases -
we cannot satisfy all three simultaneously (see Supplement,
Proof 1). They include a positive and negative case, but we
use only the positive case. Let G denote the group of the
defendants (here, a boolean for ethnicity), Y be the ground
truth label (here, actual recidivism risk category) and Yˆ be
the classifier’s predicted label; let 1 denote the high risk
category and 0 low risk.
The sufficiency of a classifier (Suff) involves the difference
in precision between groups (i.e. the probability of positive
ground truth, given a positive prediction):
Prec = P (Y = 1 | Yˆ = 1) and
Suff = |PrecG=0 − PrecG=1 |
Violation of Suff means that a positive prediction is more
reliable for one group: and if positive classifications are less
reliable for one group, then they cannot be used naively for
decisions.
The Equalised Odds measure (∆F ) involves the difference
in false positive rate between groups:
FPR = P (Yˆ = 1 | Y = 0) and
∆F = |FPRG=0 − FPRG=1 |
Violating ∆F means we are more likely to wrongly predict
that one group will reoffend than another group. This was
the allegation in the ProPublica analysis: African Americans
were more likely to be incorrectly labelled ’high risk’ than
white Americans (Larson et al., 2016).
Finally, Statistical Parity (SP) involves the difference be-
tween groups in the probability of predicting a positive
label:
SP = |P (Yˆ = 1 | G = 0)− P (Yˆ = 1 | G = 1) |
(Note that these are really unfairness measures: that is,
higher values indicate greater differences in handling differ-
ent groups.)
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Using any set of fairness measures M and a set of example
cases X , we can define the LGFO, the expected damages
resulting from a hypothetical civil suit for wrongful classifi-
cation:
LGFO =
∑
m∈M
P (m)
∑
x∈X
C(yˆ, ym)
where yˆ = c(x) is the decision originally made by the ML
system, ym is the decision that would have been made under
fairness measure m, P (m) is the probability that the court
prefers that measure, and C(y, ym) is the misclassification
cost of y according to m.
The LGFO Algorithm
Choose a particularly simple approach to minimizing the
LGFO: we fix the classifer and modify group-dependent
thresholds (Algorithm 1). This finds a separate score thresh-
old for each group, such that the thresholds minimise overall
multi-measure cost.
Let the expected legal cost of changing an outcome from
positive to negative be P2N and the cost of changing from
negative to positive be N2P. LetX be the set of all inputs
to the classifier. Let yˆi(x) ∈ {0, 1} be the predicted label
for x after the raw score is thresholded by si, which is a
tuple (t0, t1) of per-group thresholds.
Let P ∗ be a target number of positive classifications, which
we set in order to avoid trivially fair cases (such as classify-
ing all inputs as positive). Ideally we would consider cases
where we exactly achieve P ∗ positives; in practice this is
not always possible.
Let M be the set of fairness measures to balance, Cm be
the set of costs incurred by applying measure m alone over
each threshold s ∈ S. The misclassification cost (of a
threshold pair si relative to the best threshold pair sj) O is,
for example x:
O(x, si, sj) =
 P2N, if yˆi(x)− yˆj(x) = 1N2P, if yˆi(x)− yˆj(x) = −1
0, otherwise
The output is the threshold pair which gives the minimum
summed cost Csum; that is, the lowest cost we can obtain
under all measures.
We validated LGFO using the COMPAS dataset (Bellamy
et al., 2018; Larson et al., 2016): we implemented a PyTorch
binary classifier predicting the probability of belonging to
the ’High chance of violent recidivism’ class. The origi-
nal COMPAS system used a scoring system; our approach
mirrors ProPublica in merging Medium and High risk cat-
egories and constructing a binary classifier for this new
group.
2.1. Cost sensitivity
A property that then naturally arises is cost-sensitivity. Con-
sider a measure cost-sensitive if it leads to large changes in
cost for small changes in absolute measure value.
Cost-insensitive measures can be relaxed to a much greater
degree without incurring large social cost. This provides an
opportunity to improve on other measures which are more
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Algorithm 1 Minimizing LGFO
Input: M : set of fairness measures to balance,
X: examples,
Yˆ: classifier scores, c(x) ∀x ∈ X
P ∗: target number of positives
1 S = get thresholds(X, Yˆ, P ∗)
2 Cm = [ ]
3 forall m ∈M do
4 smin = argmin
s∈S
(m(s))
5 forall si ∈ S, si 6= smin do
6 C =
∑
x∈X O(x, si, smin)
7 Cm[si] = C
8 forall si ∈ S do
9 Csum[si] =
∑
m∈M Cm[si]
10 return argmin
s∈S
(Csum)
11 Procedure get thresholds(X, Yˆ, P ∗)
12 S = [ ]
13 forall t ∈ [0, 0.02, ..., 1] do
14 np′ , nq′ =∞
15 forall t0, t1 ∈ [0, 0.02, ..., 1] do
16 sp = (t, t1)
17 sq = (t0, t)
18 np =
∑
x∈X yˆp(x)
19 nq =
∑
x∈X yˆq(x)
20 if |np − P ∗| < np′ then
21 np′ = np
22 sp′ = sp
23 if |nq − P ∗| < nq′ then
24 nq′ = nq
25 sp′ = sq
26 append sp′ to S
27 append sq′ to S
28 return S
sensitive to cost, leading to an output that is more fair under
more definitions.
3. Results
Figure 1 compares the raw values of our chosen fairness
measures at different thresholds; Figure 2 shows the cost
of violating the fairness measure. Figure 3 then shows the
summed cost which yields the minimal-cost fair configura-
tion.
It is helpful to visualise costs as a curve by ordering thresh-
old pairs from highly preferential treatment for one group to
highly preferential treatment for the other, with the midpoint
being equal treatment for both groups. The ’Threshold pair
index’ then represents the index of this ordered collection.
Fairer COMPAS predictions
In Figure 1 we see that SP and ∆F roughly agree on the
fairest region. This is because both encapsulate a similar no-
tion of fairness, penalising discrepancies between group out-
comes. The cost-optimal thresholds found are [0.54,0.41],
corresponding to slightly favourable treatment for African
Americans.
0 25 50 75 100 125 150 175
Threshold pair index
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Va
lu
es
Metric values at each threshold pair
optimal threshold pair
SP
dFPR
pSUFF
Figure 1. Unfairness values over threshold choices.
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Figure 2. Costs of deviating from the optimal configuration of each
measure in LGFO.
LFGO vs uncorrected classification
To evaluate our algorithm, we compare the LGFO classi-
fication to the uncorrected classification (equivalent to the
threshold pair [0.5, 0.5]).
Legally grounded fairness objectives
0 25 50 75 100 125 150 175
Threshold pair index
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
Co
st
Summed costs
Figure 3. Summed individual measure costs. The minima is our
cost-optimality configuration. This aligns with the optimal for
∆F .
Table 1. measure results for the uncorrected and LGFO classifiers
MEASURE UNCORRECTED LGFO
STATISTICAL PARITY 0.236 0.029
SUFF 0.062 0.154
∆F 0.162 0.033
ACCURACY 67.0% 65.7%
We see our corrected model makes the trade off of Suffi-
ciency for Statistical Parity and Equalised Odds. There is
also a small accuracy decrease of 2%. Accuracy is main-
tained, since LGFO mostly changes classifications only for
defendants receiving uncertain predictions. Inputs with pre-
dictive values close to 0 or 1 will only see changes to their
outcomes in extreme decision boundaries, i.e. those that are
unfair by our measures. Our algorithm only changes out-
comes for a fraction of individuals, those the raw classifier
is more likely to mislabel.
Looking at Figure 4, we see that the Uncorrected predictor
significantly under-represents white plaintiffs in positive
predictions versus the ground truth data. LGFO corrects for
this, bringing the number of predictions closer to the ground
truth.
Cost-sensitivity
We see that Suff is the most cost-sensitive measure: we see
the same cost incurred when Suff = 0.2 as we do when
∆F = 0.5. This explains the result in Table 1, in which
Sufficiency actually decreases after applying LGFO: this is a
principled trade for greatly reduced unfairness on the other
measures. The key result is that inspecting the measure
values themselves is insufficient to judge the actual relative
ground truth LGFO uncorrected
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Figure 4. Comparing corrected and uncorrected per-group positive
predictions to ground truth.
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Figure 5. Value of the measures at each threshold pair.
fairness of two classifiers: taking the damages into account
shows that lower measure fairness can occur when damages
are reduced.
Illustrative scenarios
We now investigate LFGO with counterfactual scenarios.
INTERMEDIATE FAIRNESS
In place of true legal costs, this scenario sets P2N = 0
and N2P = 1. This corresponds to the cost of changing
a prediction to ’highly likely to reoffend’ (a false positive)
being higher than the converse (false negative).
Next compare the cost of violating a measure to the degree
of violation (Cm vs m(X)). In Figure 5 we see that to
minimise Suff (around x = 20), we incur high ∆F ; but
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Figure 6. Costs of deviating from the optimal configuration for
each measure.
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Figure 7. Summed individual measure costs. The minimum corre-
sponds to our cost-optimal fair configuration - a trade off between
both measures.
conversely a very low ∆F (around x = 23) results in mod-
erate Suff . When comparing the costs, however (Figure 6),
we see that costs are actually equal for both thresholds.
Figure 7 shows the minimum summed-cost point. This
cost-minimal configuration occurs in-between the optimal
Suff or ∆F , corresponding to partial unfairness on both
accounts; but this simultaneous relaxation yields a better
social outcome than optimising for either alone.
SINGLE-TYPE FAIRNESS
Figure 8 is from a scenario with P2N = 1 and N2P = 0.
Intermediate thresholds yield higher cost than optimising
for either measure individually. The local maximum occurs
at the same location as the minimum in Figure 7, which
implies that while the measure values are reasonable, we
actually cause more harm in trying to balance both than
when a single measure is used.
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Figure 8. Summed individual measure costs. Here cost-optimality
occurs under optimisation of a single measure. In this case partial
satisfaction of both measures yields a higher cost.
4. Discussion
LGFO has several virtues: it brings fairness into business
operations, by setting an unambiguous, hard-to-game mone-
tary incentive towards fair systems. It also allows for stake-
holders other than the technical team to contribute to the
system design, and makes use of long-standing legal exper-
tise on decision-making in complex social situations.
We found that our algorithm was able to correct for erro-
neous bias in a neural classifier using a real-world dataset,
while conserving performance. Fairness algorithms should
remain performance-competitive, to make it more likely that
they are actually implemented. On our dataset and classifier
we noted a small (2% relative) loss of overall accuracy from
applying LGFO; however, as shown in Figure 4, this minor
performance cost impacts each group differently.
Limitations
Our approach cannot be applied immediately to arbitrary
data, but requires a careful elicitation step. This is due to
the lack of explicit use of formal fairness measures in most
legal systems (Xiang & Raji, 2019).
In the present experiments, we use ProPublica’s binarised
risk groups, which does not reflect the actual use of deployed
systems, nor the finer-grained information in the original
scores.
We only handle binary classification; however, extensions
of the method to other learning settings is a possible area for
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future experimentation. We could also extend the method
to other stages of the ML pipeline. The LGFO value could,
for instance, be used in the training stage of the classifier.
Clearly, the legal system is also an imperfect estimator of
social cost, and has its own biases (Zamir & Ritov, 2012;
Berrey et al., 2012). But it seems unlikely to be more biased
(or unaccountable) than a lone technical team with no clear
incentives towards fairness. LGFO ties ML into an existing
democratic process with greater domain knowledge of the
tradeoffs involved.
The LGFO estimation process is unavoidably local: the
distribution over fairness definitions, and the damages in-
volved, will vary greatly between jurisdictions. But this is
just the converse of the method’s strength: that it makes use
of actual domain knowledge.
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A. Proofs of metric incompatibility
The proofs rely on the following three short theorems from (?) page 264 and follow the methods of (Barocas et al., 2019).
Also see (?) for proof of the incompatibility of the fairness metrics.
X ⊥ Y |Z =⇒ Y ⊥ X|Z (1)
X ⊥ Y |Z and X ⊥ Z|Y =⇒ X ⊥ (Y, Z) (2)
Finally, assuming all events have positive probabilities:
X ⊥ Y |Z and X ⊥ Z =⇒ X ⊥ (Y,Z) (3)
We give the probabilistic definitions for each of these three metrics here.
• Equalised Odds: Yˆ ⊥ A|Y
• Statistical Parity: Yˆ ⊥ A
• Sufficiency: Y ⊥ A|Yˆ
A.1. Statistical Parity vs Sufficiency
Assuming Statistical Parity (Yˆ ⊥ A) and Sufficiency (Y ⊥ A|Yˆ ≡ A ⊥ Y |Yˆ ) (equivalence from theorem (1)). Then by
theorem (3), we have A ⊥ (Y, Yˆ ). This means that enforcing statistical parity and sufficiency simultaneously only holds
when A ⊥ Y , meaning when base rates across groups are equal. This, of course, is unrealistic with a real world dataset.
A.2. Equalised Odds vs Sufficiency
Given Equalised Odds (Yˆ ⊥ A|Y ) and Sufficiency (Y ⊥ A|Yˆ ). Rearranging both using theorem (1) gives A ⊥ Yˆ |Y
and A ⊥ Y |Yˆ . Then from theorem (2) we have A ⊥ (Y, Yˆ ) which is identical to the problems in Statistical Parity vs
Sufficiency.
B. Proof of incompatibility of Statistical Parity and Equalised Odds in the binary case.
Follows (Barocas et al., 2019) page 55 prop. 3.
Assume Y is binary, A is not independent of Y , and Yˆ is not independent of Y . Then, independence and separation cannot
both hold. Assume Y ∈ {0, 1}. In its contra-positive form, the statement we need to show is A ⊥ Yˆ and A ⊥ Yˆ |Y =⇒
A ⊥ Y or Yˆ ⊥ Y .
By the law of total probability1,
P (Yˆ = yˆ|A = a) =
∑
P (Yˆ = yˆ|A = a, Y = y)P (Y = y|A = a)
Applying the assumption A ⊥ Yˆ and A ⊥ Yˆ |Y , this equation simplifies to
P (Yˆ = yˆ) =
∑
P (Yˆ = yˆ|Y = y)P (Y = y|A = a)
1
P (A | C) =
∑
n
P (A | C ∩Bn)P (Bn | C)
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Applied differently, the law of total probability2 also gives
P (Yˆ = yˆ) =
∑
P (Yˆ = yˆ|Y = y)P (Y = y)
Combining this with the previous equation, we have∑
P (Yˆ = yˆ|Y = y)P (Y = y) =
∑
P (Yˆ = yˆ|Y = y)P (Y = y|A = a)
Inspection of this equation reveals that when y is binary, this equation can only be satisfied if A ⊥ Y or Yˆ ⊥ Y .
We can rewrite the equation more compactly using
p = P (Y = 0), pa = P (Y = 0|A = a), yˆy = P (Yˆ = yˆ|Y = y)
as:
pyˆ0 + (1− p)yˆ1 = payˆ0 + (1− pa)yˆ1
Subtracting yˆ1 from both sides gives:
p ∗ (yˆ0 − yˆ1) = pa ∗ (yˆ0 − yˆ1)
This equation can only be satisfied if yˆ0 = yˆ1, in which case Yˆ ⊥ Y , or if ∀a, p = pa, in which case Y ⊥ A
The problem of A ⊥ Y is discussed in the previous section. Yˆ ⊥ Y is problematic as it means our classifier does not have
utility - predictions are independent of the true values.
2
P (A) =
∑
n
P (A | Bn)P (Bn)
